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Professionalizing Clinical Ethics
Consultation—Are We There Yet?

M

ost everyone would agree that
people doing the work of clinical
ethics consultation (CEC) should
be qualified. Relevant stakeholders in situations where the help of a CEC is requested
are often at their most vulnerable emotionally, physically, and spiritually. Typically, the
stakes are high. The last thing we would want
is for someone without the requisite qualifications, however well-meaning, to make the
situation worse, or even simply to fail to help.
Concerns along these lines are creating
momentum to professionalize the field of
CEC. When a field is fully professionalized,
it self-regulates its membership and educational institutions in the name of some public
good, and ensures that formal standards (e.g.,
standards of practice and a code of ethics)
are upheld by practitioners and taught by
programs that educate and train those practitioners (i.e., through accreditation, certificates
and/or diplomas) (Baker, 1997). Proponents
argue that “professionalization” is needed
to ensure quality and accountability of those
responding to ethical questions, concerns, and
conflicts in health care settings.
Toward this effort, a group of health
care ethicists has begun to identify the
scope of CEC services and the specialized
knowledge and skills competencies of
its practitioners. These services and
competencies are delineated in the American
Society for Bioethics and Humanities’
Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics
Consultation (1998). Yet, there is currently
no credentialing process by which clinical
ethics (CE) consultants can demonstrate that
they possess these Core Competencies, nor
any accreditation process by which to judge

graduate programs as meeting minimum
standards for educating and training CE
consultants. Moreover, there is no code of
ethics for the field.
One might ask whether professionalizing
the field of CEC is necessary to improve CEC
services. One way of answering that question
is to determine whether those performing CEC
services are qualified. Fox and colleagues’
estimated that 29,000 individuals devote
more than 314,000 hours to performing ethics
consultations in U.S. hospitals each year (Fox,
et al., 2007). According to survey findings,
only 5% of these individuals completed a
fellowship or graduate degree program in
bioethics. This mirrors findings from a survey
of Maryland hospital ethics committees, which
showed that the majority of ethics committee members had little formal education or
training in ethics (Hoffmann, et al., 2000). Yet,
there is currently no evidence that individuals
who completed a graduate degree or fellowship program in bioethics are competent to
perform CEC. What about others? According
to Fox, et al.’s survey, 41% of CE consultants
learned how to perform ethics consultation via
formal, direct supervision by an experienced
member of an ethics consultation service, and
45% learned independently, without formal,
direct supervision. While we can agree that
those with no education or training in CEC are
unlikely to possess all the requisite competencies, what evidence do we have that individuals trained through an independent learning or
apprenticeship model are not fully qualified to
perform CEC?
Before addressing the question of which
training model produces the most qualified
CE consultant, we need to understand the
nature of CEC.
Cont. on page 3
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The Maryland Health Care Ethics Committee Network co-sponsored the conference,
“Health Care Ethics Committees and Maryland Law—Time for a Change?” on
December 3, 2008 (see the article in this issue for a recap of conference highlights).
Proceedings and discussions generated by the conference are informing efforts to
explore whether to propose changes to Maryland’s Patient Care Advisory Committee Act
or Health Care Decisions Act. MHECN is planning to survey risk managers and hospital
counsel regarding interpretations of medically ineffective determinations to further
inform these efforts. In June, 2009, MHECN will sponsor a basic ethics education
conference. Details about this conference will be announced soon. For more information,
e-mail MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or phone (410) 706-4457.
The West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees (WVNEC) is coordinated by
the Center for Health Ethics and Law of the Robert C. Byrd Health Sciences Center
of West Virginia University. WVNEC has a new website featuring links to member
resources (including ethics committee tools, WV advance directive forms and laws,
and an upcoming calendar of events). Contact Cindy Jamison for more information at
cjamison@hsc.wvu.edu.
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program at the
University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate and
enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings
by supporting and providing informational and educational resources to ethics
committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network
will achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical
dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist their institution
to act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network
members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general public on ethical issues in health
care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and
ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.

Professionalizing Clinical Ethics Consultation – Are We There Yet?
Cont. from page 1

What is clinical ethics
consultation, and how
do we know it helps?

Innovations in medicine have expanded
health care options while increasing the
complexity of medical decision-making.
Our fragmented U.S. health care system,
rising health care costs, and growing
numbers of under- and uninsured, are just
some of the contributors to ethics questions,
concerns, and conflicts, being encountered
daily in health care settings across the
country. Health care ethics committees,
and more specifically, CEC services, have
evolved as one way of addressing these
issues. CEC refers to “services provided by
an individual or a group to help patients,
families, surrogates, health care providers,
or other involved parties address uncertainty
or conflict regarding value-laden concerns
that emerge in health care” (ASBH, in
press). Evidence that qualified CEC services
produce a valued benefit may be extrapolated from the fact that high-volume,
well-functioning CEC services attract
repeat requests for these services (Fox, et
al., 2007). This assumes that individuals at
health care facilities with a well-functioning CEC service learn to recognize ethics
questions and concerns, and request help
from the CEC service to help resolve them.
Under-qualified CE consultants most likely
fail to demonstrate the full potential of CEC
because they lack the specialized knowledge or skills to effectively address ethics
concerns, and to distinguish CEC from
other types of consultations (e.g., medicine,
chaplaincy, palliative care, social work).

what should the
minimum standards be
to deem a consultant
as qualified?

The Core Competencies lists basic
skills and knowledge competencies that
everyone involved in a consultation must
possess, as well as advanced skills and
knowledge competencies that at least one
person involved in a consult must possess.
For example, everyone involved in CEC
services should have a basic ability to
analyze the value uncertainty or conflict in
the case brought to them (e.g., recognize

different stakeholders’ interpretations of
promoting the patient’s well-being), but at
least one individual should have advanced
skills in this area (e.g., mediation skills to
resolve a conflict). To advance the goal
of professionalizing the field of CEC,
the minimum standards for a CE professional would be set at the level of an
advanced practitioner—that is, someone
who demonstrates all the identified skills
and knowledge competencies in the Core
Competencies, and any other recognized
“standards of practice” for an advanced
CEC practitioner.*
This admittedly leaves out other
individuals performing CEC who only
possess some of the required competencies. The Core Competencies acknowledges that not all health care facilities will
have a professional ethicist, and provides
two alternatives for meeting minimum
standards: (1) a team CEC approach, in
which all members of the team possess the
required basic competencies, and individual members in combination possess the
required advanced competencies (but no
one individual possesses all the basic and
advanced competencies), or (2) a qualified CE consultant with advanced CEC
knowledge and skills leads each ethics
consultation, and others who have at least
basic competency are also involved.
Establishing a method to demonstrate
only basic CEC knowledge and skills
competencies would not address the issue
at hand, since the basic competencies are
necessary but not sufficient to effectively
perform CEC. Notwithstanding situation
#1 above in which the necessary advanced
knowledge and skills are found at the collective level of the team rather than in one
individual, a move toward professionalizing CEC is a way to ensure that at least
one individual responding to a consultation
request has both basic and advanced CEC
knowledge and skills.

Accrediting oR
credentialing?

Methods by which individuals could
demonstrate meeting necessary expert
CEC competencies include accrediting
training programs and credentialing individuals. Accreditation involves an external
body ensuring that standards for train-

The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) is a
professional organization for people
engaged in clinical and academic
bioethics and the medical humanities.
ASBH has formed a new standing
committee on Clinical Ethics Consultation Affairs, which will work on
standards for the field and address
possibilities for credentialing clinical ethics consultants and accrediting graduate training programs. An
ASBH task force is also updating the
Core Competencies for Health Care
Ethics Consultation, a document that
outlines what skills and knowledge
competencies one must have to respond to ethics consultation requests
in health care facilities. Anita Tarzian
is chairing both the task force and the
new committee. Learn more about
ASBH, including the annual conference that will be held in Washington,
D.C. in October, by visiting http://
www.asbh.org.
ing competent CE consultants have been
met—similar to how the Joint Commission accredits hospitals—and to how the
Liaison Committee on Medical Education
accredits medical schools. Such efforts
would ensure consistency across graduate
bioethics programs, which currently vary
tremendously in their ability to prepare
qualified CE consultants. One criticism of
such programs is their lack of a mandatory
clinical practicum, particularly for individuals with no prior clinical background.
Another concern with this approach is that
individuals who have not met competency
benchmarks might still graduate from such
a program and thus be recognized as a
professional CE consultant despite failing
to meet minimum standards.
The program accreditation method
would not address how to recognize those
currently functioning as expert CE consultants. Given that, according to Fox, et al.’s
estimate, 95% of individuals currently doing CEC have no formal training, and the
remaining 5% have received formal training from a non-accredited program, we can
Cont. on page 9
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THE CASE OF MR. M—
A STUDY OF DICHOTOMIES

r. M had fashioned a reasonable
life for himself after surviving an assault in which he was
stabbed in the neck 10 years ago. The
knife had penetrated one side of his cervical spine and brainstem. He was hemiplegic with a hemi-diaphragm paralysis. He
had various problems with motor function (uncoordinated muscle movements,
dizziness or fainting in certain upright
positions, and difficulty tracking objects
with his eyes). He had a tracheostomy (an
opening in the throat used to connect to a
ventilator), and was initially ventilator dependent, but regained the ability to breathe
on his own during the day, spending his
nights on the ventilator. He spent his days
in a wheelchair and mobilized himself
independently with his good leg and arm.
He could feed himself, but required some
assistance with transfers, bathing, dressing and grooming. He was continent of
bowel but incontinent of bladder and used
an external catheter. He suffered muscle
spasms that were controlled with benzodiazepines. Other than an occasional urinary
tract infection, his medical status was quite
stable over the years.
Mr. M had expert computer skills. He
spent much of his days on the Internet. He
was entrusted with computer repair work
and computer troubleshooting by the staff
of the chronic care hospital, where he
resided for the eight years after his injury.
He mobilized around the grounds of the
chronic care hospital. He received visitors from the surrounding neighborhood,
where he had lived prior to his injury. He
had befriended some of the staff, who
brought him treats from local grocers and
delis. Despite these social strengths, Mr.
M’s care was very difficult for the staff.
He often refused his daily care and was
typically angry and verbally abusive to the
staff. He smoked heavily each day. The
pulmonology staff caring for him felt he
might be a candidate for a less invasive
form of nocturnal ventilation, since he
used a cuffless tracheostomy, receiving
high volume air flow without significant
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pressure support from the ventilator. He
refused to be evaluated for this. Although
his health care team felt he might eventually be able to transition back into a less
restrictive community setting, he refused
to consider this possibility. He did not
qualify for Social Security or Medicare
Disability benefits, because he had not
paid any taxes on his income for the ten
years prior to his injury. When encouraged
to participate in vocational rehabilitation
and enter the work force again, he scoffed
at the idea, deriding it as bourgeois and
beneath him.

state and the hospital.”
I met Mr. M in my role as the medical director of the skilled nursing facility
accepting him in transfer from the chronic
care hospital. I became directly involved
in his care when he fired all of his physicians. As I listened to his rants, I let him
know that I would try to help him. He
saw me as a potential tool to achieve his
objectives and interacted with me very
reasonably. He told me his assailant would
be getting out of prison soon on parole,
just as he, Mr. M, was being handed a
life sentence to be confined to the nursing

“The agency determined that his physical needs could be met
and should be met at a nursing facility level of care, which
would cut his daily Medicaid rate approximately in half.
Since the chronic care hospital in which he had resided did
not offer a skilled nursing level of care for ventilator patients
within its facility, Mr. M was forced to leave his home of
eight years. As he put it, ‘I got an eviction notice from the
state and the hospital.’”
The cost of his daily care as a Medicaid
recipient who was ventilator dependent
living within the chronic care hospital was
approximately $1500 per day. Over the
course of eight years, the Maryland Medicaid program had paid over $4 million
for his care. When the State of Maryland
contracted with a new agency to evaluate level of care designations, the agency
decided that Mr. M did not qualify for a
chronic care hospital level of care. Rather,
the agency determined that his physical
needs could be met and should be met at a
nursing facility level of care, which would
cut his daily Medicaid rate approximately
in half. Since the chronic care hospital
in which he had resided did not offer a
skilled nursing level of care for ventilator patients within its facility, Mr. M was
forced to leave his home of eight years. As
he put it, “I got an eviction notice from the

home. As I made phone calls on Mr. M’s
behalf, it was clear he could not return
to the chronic care hospital. He did not
need the level of care offered there, and
the chronic care hospital had determined
that it was not to their financial benefit to
offer the skilled nursing level of care he
required within their walls. Although he
never really accepted that he could not go
back, he amended his request, stating he
just wanted to get out of that particular
nursing facility. He was accepted by a second facility further away from his home
community. They made arrangements for
him to visit. He seemed genuinely pleased
with the new alternative, and was transferred.
The new locale in short order, however,
predictably failed to meet his expectations,
and he once again fell into his angry rants
and abusive behaviors with staff. He was
also verbally and physically abusive to

his roommate and the roommate’s visitors. He was given a private room. His
high volume Internet use, which involved
downloading huge files, disrupted the
Internet connections for the general users
and his Internet access was administratively curtailed. He then developed a
paranoid ideation that I personally had
conspired to bring him and confine him to
this place. Social work staff made applications for him at every other skilled nursing ventilator program in the state, and
everyone turned him down for admission.
He refused to get out of bed. He refused
to come off the ventilator during the day.
He refused his daily care and personal
hygiene. He refused psychiatric consultation at the facility. He refused any psychoactive medication. One day when he
appeared physically ill and mentally incapable of making his own decisions due to
depression, I sent him out of the facility on
an emergency petition for both psychiatric
and medical evaluation. After 24 hours in
the ER, and having refused both medical
and psychiatric intervention, he returned to
the nursing facility with the de facto diagnosis of “angry young man.” He told the
social worker that he wanted to change his
advance directive to read “do not resuscitate, do not intubate, do not hospitalize
and do not give any medical treatments.”
The psychiatry team was called again and
the patient angrily dismissed them. He
refused to engage in discussions regarding his decisions and refused medication.
He started to ask his pulmonologist about
terminal “one way” weaning. She felt he
was capable of making his own decisions.
He refused to discuss his request with
other staff members. A hospice medical

director performed an ethics consultation
and agreed with the pulmonologist that
the patient was capable of making his own
decisions. The patient was offered transfer
to a local inpatient hospice for his terminal
weaning, but declined. He actually said
that he wanted to stay at the nursing facility and said, “It’s not such a bad place.”
He wanted the option for terminal weaning, but wasn’t ready to exercise it.
Several months later, the patient suddenly decided to get out of bed and come
off the ventilator one day. He was much
weaker than before, having been selfconfined to bed and ventilator for many
months. He went out for a smoke. He
called in a friend from his old neighborhood. He summoned me to discuss the
medical technicalities of one-way weaning. He had chosen the date. He was
engaging and upbeat. He had made his
decision. He told the staff to leave him off
the ventilator that night. They told him
they would be glad to place him back on
the ventilator at any time, if he wished.
Meds were ordered for his comfort, as
needed. Morphine relieved his sense of
dyspnea, but he spent the night wideawake, fearing that if he went to sleep, he
would forget to breathe. He asked me for a
sleeping pill for the next night off the vent.
We discussed that the morphine and the
sleeping pill together would likely depress
his respirations and cause his breathing
to cease. He said that was exactly what
he desired. That evening, he refused the
ventilator for the second night. He took his
morphine and sleeping pill and died in his
sleep.
I have served as medical director and
attending physician for both chronic

care hospital and skilled nursing facility
ventilator programs over the past 20 years.
I have participated in dozens of terminal
weaning situations. I firmly believe in the
right of people to refuse unwanted medical
interventions, even if such refusal hastens
death. Usually in medicine, we do not
allow suicidally depressed patients to end
their lives. We try to treat suicidal depression, even if it means involuntary commitment for inpatient psychiatric treatment.
However, in Maryland, we do not have
any programs or facilities that can treat the
psychiatric needs of suicidally depressed
patients who also need chronic mechanical
ventilation. His was a death by dichotomy
—the dichotomy of chronic care hospital
versus skilled nursing levels of care and
funding; the dichotomy of medical versus
psychiatric health care programs; the
dichotomy of an autonomous personality
disordered individual versus a suicidally depressed patient; the dichotomy of
prescribing to relieve symptoms versus
prescribing to end a life.
Some patients are untreatable within the
confines of our current health care system.
Mr. M was one of the few “untreatables”
that I have encountered in my medical
career. I believe he might have been treatable 20 years ago. That he was untreatable
in 2008 reflects how the dichotomies have
changed in the past 20 years.
Rebecca D. Elon, MD, MPH
Associate Professor of Medicine
Johns Hopkins Univ. School of Medicine
Medical Director
Erickson Health of Howard County

UPDATE: Legal Aid sues Maryland over care of patients
The Maryland Legal Aid Bureau sued the state on March 6 to try to stop it from moving low-income patients on ventilators
out of chronic care hospitals and into nursing homes. The suit, filed in Baltimore Circuit Court, argues that the state Health
Department didn't follow legal requirements in 2006 when it altered guidelines for patients' eligibility for government-funded
hospital care. It maintains that the state is enforcing the rule only to save money in the Medicaid program amid a serious budget crunch. See http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/health/bal-md.ventilator06mar06,0,3039041.story.

Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 

O

SHOULD MARYLAND CHANGE ITS
patient care advisory committee act?

n December 3, 2008, MHECN
co-sponsored the conference,
“Health Care Ethics Committees
and Maryland Law—Time for a Change?”
Jack Schwartz, JD, Health Care Law and
Policy Fellow with the Law & Health Care
Program at the University of Maryland
School of Law, opened the day with an
overview of relevant Maryland law. The
Patient Care Advisory Committee (PCAC)
Act requires hospitals and nursing homes
in Maryland to establish an advisory
committee (i.e., “ethics committee”) to
give advice in cases involving individuals
with life-threatening conditions, in order
to help lay out ethically justifiable options
for care and treatment. The committee
may also educate patients and staff regarding health care decision-making, and review and recommend institutional policies
and guidelines concerning the withholding
of medical treatment. The ethics committee (EC) must include at least the following: a physician, a nurse, a social worker,
the CEO or his/her designee, and, in cases
involving medical care of a child with a
life-threatening condition, a medical professional with expertise in pediatric endof-life care. The institution must adopt
written procedures for handling petitions
to the EC. Nursing homes may have their
own EC or may collaborate with a hospital
EC or join with other nursing homes to
establish a committee serving multiple
facilities.
The Maryland Health Care Decisions
Act (HCDA) establishes legal standards
for end-of-life medical decision-making,
including the use of advance directives,
and procedures for identifying a surrogate
decision-maker if a patient does not
have the capacity to make his or her
own medical treatment decisions. If
surrogates with equal decision making
priority disagree about a health care
decision, the attending physician or a
surrogate must refer the case to the EC.
The physician does not have to follow the
EC’s recommendations. However, health
care providers who take actions based on
the HCDA, and health care agents and
surrogates who follow the HCDA, are
provided immunity from liability or claims
that their actions were unauthorized. The
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EC may also play a role when practitioners
believe the decision-maker is not acting
within medically accepted standards if
requesting that a life-sustaining procedure
be withheld or withdrawn.
Schwartz proposed the following questions for conference attendees to consider:
• Should Maryland law say more about
the process and outcomes of ECs,
or the qualifications of members?
If so, what?
• Is there a problem with the law’s
emphasis on an EC giving “advice”?
If so, how might the law be changed
to address this problem?
Schwartz recognized the challenge in
achieving a balance between tolerating
ineffective EC performance via lack of
standards, and over-regulating ECs with
too much legislative detail.
Diane Hoffmann, JD, MS, law professor
and Director of the Law & Health Care
Program at the University of Maryland
School of Law, explored the question
of whether ECs are accomplishing their
goals. Hoffmann reviewed findings from
survey data of Maryland hospitals on
EC functioning. In general, respondents
indicated a need for more training of EC
members and a more formal process for
consultations. Some respondents questioned the role and value of the EC, and
called for better role definition.
Hoffmann proposed the following questions for consideration:
• Should case consultation be the
primary role for ECs? If so, are ECs
doing a good job at it? Do they have
the appropriate expertise and
composition? Are users satisfied? Do
they have sufficient independence
from the health care institution, and
are they seen as not having a conflict
of interest?
• Should the case consultation model be
expanded to include organizational
ethics? If so, what expertise is needed
on ECs to serve that function?
• Do any of these changes require
changes in Maryland law?
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, Ethics and Research Consultant and MHECN Program

Coordinator, gave an overview of current
standards for clinical ethics consultation
as identified in the Core Competencies for
Health Care Ethics Consultation, published by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH, 1998), and
currently under revision. Tarzian described
approaches to credential qualified clinical
ethics consultants and/or accredit programs that train such consultants, and the
pros and cons of moves toward professionalizing the field of clinical ethics consultation (see lead article in this issue).
Data reveal that most individuals
performing ethics consultations lack
formal education or training, and are
involved in very few consults annually.
Tarzian questioned whether this reflects
a need to: (1) enhance the consistency
and quality of ethics consultations
by addressing qualifications of those
performing consults, and attend to
procedural standards for implementing
and evaluating ethics consultation
requests, or (2) move toward an integrated
ethics model, in which the EC focuses on
enhancing institutional staff members’
ethical awareness and knowledge and
address problems proactively, rather than
focusing on case consultations per se. One
question she raised is whether Maryland
law should require health care facilities
to demonstrate competency of its EC
members.
A segment of the conference was devoted to sharing various EC performance
improvement models. Ellen Fox, MD,
Chief Officer for Ethics in Health Care at
the National Center for Ethics in Healthcare at the Veterans Health Administration, provided an overview of the Veterans
Health Administration’s “IntegratedEthics” program, which has a goal of establishing a national, standardized, comprehensive, systematic, integrated approach to
ethics in health care. Improving the quality
of ethics services in VA hospitals is aimed
at improving employee morale, increasing
patient satisfaction, reducing legal liability, improving efficiency and productivity, and lowering the use of inappropriate
medical treatments.
The IntegratedEthics program includes
three core functions:

• ethics consultation (responding to
ethics questions in health care)
• preventive ethics (addressing ethics
quality gaps on a systems level), and
• ethical leadership (fostering an ethical
environment and culture).
Workbooks and resource tools for all these
domains are available at www.ethics.va.gov/
integratedethics.
Evan DeRenzo, PhD, bioethicist with the
Center for Ethics at Washington Hospital
Center, described efforts to reduce “nondilemmatic consults” at Washington Hospital Center through a “train the trainer”
educational model, with the “trainer” being
the hospital clinicians. One of the primary
methods to achieve this is by weekly
rounding in different wards or units—that
is, joining clinical teams for their regular
work rounds. DeRenzo identified problems
with the traditional “retrospective” ethics
consultation, in that conflict often already
exists, and sometimes polarization sets in
among involved stakeholders. In contrast,
proactive measures such as ethics rounding
heads off conflict before it arises, trains the
clinicians to handle routine ethics issues
themselves, and strengthens moral courage
among health care staff. For example, if
an attending does not raise an issue that
a rounding ethicist identifies, the ethicist
raises the issue, which reduces tension produced by other staff involved. The rounding ethicist can ask a question, such as,
“Who speaks for this patient?”, producing
discussion that identifies a previously unrecognized ethical problem (e.g., the team
has been talking to the wrong surrogate).
Over time, the attending physicians learn
to ask the same questions, which teaches
them to engage in preventive ethics. This
results in the EC only getting the truly "dilemmatic" cases that require the diversity
of perspectives from the full committee.
DeRenzo acknowledged that the rounding
method is resource intensive, but points
to research showing that ethics consultation services pay for themselves via a
secondary benefit of reduced expenditures
(e.g., reduced length of ICU stay) without compromising quality of patient care.
More importantly, the “upstream model” of
ethics education through rounding elevates
the moral discourse within the facility and

within the committee, and invigorates and
energizes the EC, which can focus on the
cases for which it is truly needed.
Henry Silverman, MD, MA, Chair
of the Clinical Ethics Committee at the
University of Maryland Medical Center,
presented approaches taken to enhance
the quality of UMMC’s EC via, among
other things, on-line educational resources

extramural committee (e.g., a nursing
home that uses the services of a hospital’s
EC), a quasi-appellate committee (e.g., a
committee comprised of representatives
from various other health care facility
ECs who review cases that might present
a conflict of interest if reviewed by the
home institution’s EC), and a shared/joint
committee (e.g., two or more facilities

“Proactive measures such as ethics rounding heads off
conflict before it arises, trains the clinicians to handle routine
ethics issues themselves, and strengthens moral courage
among health care staff.”
for EC members and staff, new employee
orientation presentations, presence on
the hospital’s intranet, ward rounds, and
quality improvement activities (such
as an ethics consult feedback form).
The EC at UMMC has taken steps to
address organizational structures and
processes that generate particular patterns
of unethical behavior. For example, a
committee within the hospital developed
a Resuscitation Order Form to prevent
miscommunication regarding the
meaning of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR)
orders. Also, a hospital-wide survey was
conducted to identify sources of ethical
conflict among staff in their everyday
patient care duties. Findings revealed
that there were inadequate opportunities
for staff to discuss ethical dilemmas they
encountered, and some perceived that
open inquiry was not supported in the
institution. In response, the following
proactive measures were instituted: ward
rounds, establishment of weekly neonatal
staff meetings to discuss controversial
cases, and monthly half-hour discussions
with internal medicine residents at which
residents choose a patient for whom they
think there are ethical issues to discuss.
Thaddeus Pope, JD, PhD, Associate
Professor at Widener University Law
School, proposed the multi-institutional
health care EC as an alternative to the
intramural committee. Types of multiinstitutional committees include a network
(such as MHECN, but one that would
provide ethics consultation services), an

that share an extramural, stand-alone EC).
Pope proposed that these alternatives may
protect against inherent risks of intramural
committees, which include making
recommendations that may be biased,
careless, arbitrary, or corrupted by conflicts
of interest or power hierarchies within the
institution. However, Pope recognized
the obstacles to these alternatives, which
include transaction costs, inconvenience,
and concerns about confidentiality and
liability.
In the final conference session, attendees discussed whether current Maryland
law should stay the same or be revised.
“Brain-storming” suggestions for revisions
included:
• Mandate trigger-points for an ethics
consult, such as a certain number of
days in the ICU.
• Mandate minimum education for EC
members involved in ethics consultations.
• Mandate public disclosure of ethics
service outcomes or institutional
standards.
Others felt that legislative solutions simply create other problems. They believed
that ECs should improve their services by
addressing the problems highlighted in
the conference sessions, such as properly
training and educating EC members,
developing EC procedural standards, and
increasing awareness of ethics services
within an institution.
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 

Philosopher’s Corner:
Decision-Making Competence

E

thics committees are frequently
called upon to determine whether
individuals possess the requisite capacity to consent to, or refuse, a particular
medical treatment. A committee might be
asked, for example, to determine whether
an adult patient with impaired cognitive
abilities can refuse a life-saving treatment, or whether a child with cancer can
decline further rounds of chemotherapy.
In each case, the committee must ascertain whether the patient is competent to
make critical health care decisions. What
standards of competence should guide the
committee’s analysis?
The answer to this question emerges at
the intersection of law, ethics, and philosophy. Though each discipline has its own
methods for assessing competence,1 there
is general interdisciplinary agreement that
competent individuals have the capacity
for (1) communication, (2) understanding,
(3) appreciation, (4) deliberation, and (5) a
set of values to guide their choice.
Before describing each of these elements, it is important to keep in mind
that competence is “always competence
for some task—competence to do something.”2 It is incomplete to say that a
person is competent or incompetent
without specifying the nature of the choice
and the circumstances in which the choice
is made. A person who is competent to
make his or her meals may not be competent to drive a car, just as a person who is
competent to make health care decisions
while lucid may not be competent to make
those same decisions if cognitively impaired. Determinations about competence
should therefore be determinations about
an individual’s ability to make a certain
choice, at a particular time, in a concrete
context.3

choice. Due either to age or disease process, some people with limited linguistic,
conceptual, or cognitive abilities may not
meet this basic element of capacity. Failure
to communicate usually signals a person’s
inability to satisfy the remaining elements,
but ability to communicate is not alone
sufficient to determine decision-making
competence.

Communication
In assessing competence, the first
capacity to evaluate is a person’s ability to
communicate. Communication involves
participating in conversations about the
decision at hand and expressing one’s

Deliberation
Findings of competence further require
that individuals possess the capacity to
reason and deliberate. Just what constitutes adequate deliberation is the subject
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of ongoing academic discussion, but at
its most simple, deliberation involves
engaging in probabilistic reasoning about
uncertain or future outcomes of one’s decision. It entails the ability to weigh benefits
and risks and arrive at a conclusion, aware
of its possible consequences. One cannot
engage in deliberation without the capacities for understanding and appreciation.

“Most philosophers and ethicists agree that in addition to
understanding the facts involved in a particular decision,
competent individuals also appreciate the nature, meaning,
and significance of their choice.”
Understanding
The second factor to consider is whether
a person understands the facts relevant
to their decision. Because the process of
comprehension involves complex sensory,
perceptual, and cognitive functions, people
suffering from a wide range of medical
conditions may have an impaired ability to
understand treatment information.4
Appreciation
Most philosophers and ethicists agree
that in addition to understanding the facts
involved in a particular decision, competent individuals also appreciate the nature,
meaning, and significance of their choice.
This means that they can envision “what it
would be like and ‘feel’ like to be in possible future states and to undergo potential
alternatives.”5 Young children with limited
life experiences, for example, may not
sufficiently appreciate the consequences of
foregoing treatment. Certain psychological
states, such as depression, also may hamper an individual’s insight into the implications of their decision.

Values
Though some theorists do not require
this fifth element of competence,6 most
philosophers contend that to be a competent decision-maker, one must have a minimally stable and consistent set of values on
which to base a decision.7 These values do
not need to be fixed or complete; they can
change over time and evolve to meet new
circumstances. They should, however, be
sufficient to allow an individual to evaluate
his or her decision and its likely outcomes
against a particular conception of the good.
When individuals make decisions that are
not internally consistent with their values,
further investigation into capacity may be
warranted.
Assessing an individual’s decisionmaking competence is challenging, and
it would be an oversimplification of the
issue to suggest that physicians or ethics
committees can merely apply the five elements outlined above to reach a judgment
in a particular case. Reasonable people
disagree not only about how to evaluate
individual capacity within each of the metrics, but also about whether the degree of
competence required should vary based on
the particular treatment decision at issue.8
What is clear is that we must take great
care in rendering determinations in these
cases so as to strike “a proper balance be-

tween respecting the autonomy of patients
who are capable of making informed decisions and protecting those with cognitive
impairment.”9
Leslie Meltzer Henry, JD
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
University of Maryland School of Law
State laws, for example, may include other
standards or may state the requirements differently.
1

Allen Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, “Deciding
for Others: Competency,” 64 Milbank Quarterly 67-80 (1986).
2

This approach contrasts with older, so-called
“global” determinations of competency that
extended to all choices, across time, regardless
of context. For a further discussion comparing decision-relative and global competency
determinations, see Allen E. Buchanan & Dan
W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of
Surrogate Decision Making, 20-23 (1989).
3

Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Applebaum,
Assessing Competence to Consent to
Treatment: A Guide for Physicians and Other
Health Professionals 39-40 (1998).
4

Buchanan and Brock, supra note 3, at 24.

5

Grisso & Applebaum, supra note 4.

6

Buchanan & Brock, supra notes 2 & 3.

7

Buchanan & Brock advocate a “sliding scale”
approach to competence, see supra note 2.
This position was also taken in The President’s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Making Health Care Decisions: A
Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications
of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner
Relationship (1982). For the opposite view,
see Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert, “The
Inadequacy of Incompetence,” 68 Milbank
Quarterly 619-43 (1990).
8

Paul S. Applebaum, “Assessment of Patients’
Competence to Consent to Treatment,” 357
New England Journal of Medicine 1834
(2007).
9

Professionalizing Clinical Ethics Consultation – Are We There Yet?
Cont. from page 3
assume that a subset of these individuals
do possess expert CEC knowledge and
skills. The question of how to “grandfather” these individuals must be addressed.
Such an approach could take the form of
credentialing them by formally evaluating
their CEC knowledge and skills competencies. A professional CE consultant
would thus have to demonstrate all basic
and advanced competencies, whereas a
“non-professional CE consultant” (i.e.,
member of a CEC service who needs only
basic competencies as part of a team approach) might undergo a different form of
credentialing or certification.
Regardless of whether we pursue an
accreditation or credentialing approach
to recognize qualified CE consultants, adequate evaluation methods will be needed.

Valid & reliable
evaluation methods

Current methods of evaluating the
competency of CE consultants include
having members of the CEC service
self-report the degree to which they meet
various skills and knowledge competencies. For example, the VA’s tool, which
was developed using the ASBH’s Core
Competencies (available at http://www.
ethics.va.gov/ethics/integratedethics/index.asp), asks the consultant to “Rate your
ability to educate the participants regarding the ethical dimensions of the case.”
Possible responses include: “not skilled,”
“somewhat skilled,” “skilled,” “very

skilled,” “expert.” While self-perception
tools provide some information regarding
an individual’s CEC knowledge and skills,
they are not robust measures of actual
skills and knowledge. Having a mentor or supervisor who has observed the
CE consultant rate that individual’s skill
level using such a tool would be a more
robust approach. However, producing
valid and reliable methods at the national
level by which CEC competencies can
be effectively evaluated is no small task.
Knowledge is easier to objectively test
than are skills, which typically require
resource-intensive observations. However,
testing objective knowledge alone (e.g., in
a board-type exam) would fail to demonstrate that an individual had the requisite
skills to practice CEC at the expert level.
Furthermore, objectively testing expert
ethics knowledge is difficult, given that
ethical analyses often produce more than
one “right answer,” and that legal standards that inform ethical analyses vary
from state to state.

based on their own professional bent, with
little appreciation for how their approach
falls short. Advocates for professionalization argue that the time has come to identify
expert CEC practitioners, hold them accountable to standards of practice in their
field, and devote the requisite resources to
allow CEC services to flourish.**

CONCLUSION

*These include emerging process standards,
such as the ability to properly triage an ethics
consult request, to adequately document the
request and why it is appropriate for the CEC
service, and to evaluate the consultation.

Those favoring staffing a CEC service
with at least one professional CE consultant argue that relying on all-volunteer,
under-qualified staff to perform CEC as an
“add-on” to their other work, without compensation or protected professional time,
contributes to poor CEC outcomes. Such
individuals may unwittingly cut corners in
the CEC process, or conduct ethics consults

Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
MHECN Program Coordinator
REFERENCES
American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities (1998). Core Competencies for
Health Care Ethics Consultation. Glenview,
IL: ASBH (Currently under revision).
Fox, E., Myers, S. & Pearlman, R.A. (2007).
Ethics consultation in United States hospitals:
A national survey. Am J Bioeth, 7(2):13-25.
Hoffmann, D., Tarzian, A., & O’Neil, J.A.
(2000). Are ethics committee members
competent to consult? J Law Med Ethics
28(1):30-40.

**Evidence exists that effective clinical ethics
consultations reduce costs spent on nonbeneficial services, and would thus be selffunding. See Gilmer, et al. (2005). The costs of
non-beneficial treatment in the intensive care
setting. Health Aff. (Millwood), 24(4):961-71.
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Case Presentation

O

ne of the regular features of the
Newsletter is the presentation of
a case considered by an ethics committee and an analysis of the ethical
issues involved. Readers are both
encouraged to comment on the case
or analysis and to submit other cases
that their ethics committee has dealt
with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in
the case should only be provided with
the permission of the patient. Unless
otherwise indicated, our policy is not
to identify the submitter or institution.
Cases and comments should be sent
to MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or
MHECN, the Law & Health Care
Program, University of Maryland
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St.,
Baltimore, MD 21201.

Case study from a
Maryland pharmacist

M

r. and Mrs. Smith are frequent
customers at ABC pharmacy.
Approximately six months ago,
the couple began fertility treatments because they were unable to conceive a child
on their own. Since then, both Mr. and
Mrs. Smith have been on several medications prescribed by their fertility doctor
to help increase their chances of conceiving. The Smiths insurance does not cover
fertility treatments and the couple has
been paying out of pocket for expenses
related to their treatment. Mr. Smith once
estimated that they pay approximately
$10,000 out of pocket per round of treatment. Recently, Mr. Smith took a second
part-time job so the couple could afford
another round of treatments.
One day, Mrs. Smith came in to the
pharmacy with a prescription for birth
control pills. The pharmacist asked her if
this meant that she and her husband had
ceased fertility treatments. Mrs. Smith
replied that she had secretly been on birth
control for the duration of their attempt
to conceive a child, including during
fertility treatments. She stated that she
had no intention of having a child but that
her husband wanted one. She felt that if
she did not at least try to conceive a child
10 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

with her husband that he would end their
marriage. Mrs. Smith tells the pharmacist
that she had been filling her birth control
prescription at a different pharmacy and
asked that the pharmacist not tell her
husband of her decision to not have a child
with him.
Concerned that taking birth control
while on fertility treatments was harmful to
the patient, the pharmacist called the OB/
GYN physician who prescribed the birth
control. This doctor informed the pharmacist that he was not aware that the patient
was undergoing fertility treatments, but
that he would not change his mind about
prescribing the birth control pills because
the treatment was still therapeutic and
not futile, i.e., it was serving the purpose
for which it was prescribed, to prevent
pregnancy.
The pharmacist then called the fertility
doctor and explained the situation. The fertility doctor told the pharmacist to mind his
own business, and that as long as he (the
fertility doctor) was being paid, he was fine
with whatever decisions his patient wanted
to make about her personal life.
Feeling that the pharmacist did not
have a choice, since there was no medical reason to not dispense the medication,
he dispensed Mrs. Smith’s birth control
pills after documenting his conversations
with her and both physicians. To this date,
he continues to dispense the wife’s birth
control pills and the wife’s and husband’s
fertility medications, even though he feels
that he is lying to the husband. He wonders
if what he is doing is ethically justifiable.

Medical Facts

A

ccording to Dr. Eugene Katz,
Reproductive Endocrinologist at
Shady Grove Fertility Center at
Greater Baltimore Medical Center, while
research has not been published on the
concomitant use of oral contraceptives
during IVF treatment (i.e., during
ovarian stimulation/retrieval or after
embryo transfer), it is possible that
such medication could impair embryo
implantation in the uterus by affecting the
woman’s uterine lining (endometrium).
Dr. Howard McClamrock, Reproductive
Endocrinologist at University of Maryland
Medical Center, concurs. Both Katz and

McClamrock did not view an appreciable
increase in risk of harm to the woman from
taking oral contraceptives concomitantly
with other IVF medications, because the
ensuing rise in hormone levels would
be relatively negligible. However,
McClamrock pointed out that there are
appreciable risks of IVF treatment itself
that should be balanced by anticipated
benefits.
Regarding the fertility physician’s response to the pharmacist, Dr. McClamrock
pointed out that since IVF clinics publish
their success rates, it does not make intuitive sense that the fertility physician in this
case would be indifferent to attempts by
a patient to thwart the success of an IVF
cycle. Since oral contraceptives are often
used before the ovarian stimulation phase
of IVF treatment, it would be important to
clarify whether the fertility physician understood that the pharmacist was questioning an improper use of oral contraceptives
during IVF.

Response from a
Bioethicist

F

aced with two seemingly incompatible prescriptions—actually, with two
apparently contradictory treatment
plans—the pharmacist’s first reaction (after
requesting, and receiving, the woman’s
explanation) was to contact each of the
prescribing physicians. Was this a breach
of confidentiality?
Some readers will likely find this question
somewhat strange. They will rightly consider that confidentiality is generally required
(and asserted) with regard to divulging
personal information to outside agents, and
is not meant to obstruct sharing of information among members of the healthcare team.
Now I can imagine circumstances where a
pharmacist might be ethically bound not to
share certain information with his client’s
physician; but the case at hand does not
seem to call for that. Clearly, in contacting the physician who had prescribed birth
control (BC) pills (“Dr. B”), the pharmacist
followed the imperative of his professional
ethics—verifying that the contradictory
medications are not potentially harmful, or
may be just futile (more on futility below).
The pharmacist and Dr. B are, with
respect to the BC prescription, indeed part

of the same healthcare team. But does the
same logic hold with regard to the physician providing fertility treatment (“Dr.
F”)? At first glance the two relationships
seem fully analogous. With regard to the
medications taken by the woman for the
fertility treatment, the pharmacist’s teammate is Dr. F; should not the pharmacist
then address to him any concern about
the problematic effects of combining this
with BC pills? Dr. F, for his part, is clearly
involved in a tripartite doctor-patient
relationship, since the fertility treatment
is directed at the husband and wife as a
couple. This seems to imply that there is
no problem in sharing the information
about the BC pills with Dr. F, even though

treatment-goal in itself, so if the woman is
determined to have an abortion if the BC
fails, the fertility treatment might, overall,
be considered futile with relation to its
proper goal, that is, having a baby. But in
the case as presented there is no report of
such determination (that is, that the wife
would abort any resulting pregnancy);
moreover, a change of heart over that is
quite possible.
Is the wife behaving sensibly? In working on her body at cross purposes, is she
acting in her own best interests—both in
terms of her health and in terms of the
convoluted relationship she is trying to
sustain? My main response to this is that,
with respect to the pharmacist’s profes-

“Was there not a breach of confidentiality in sharing her information with a physician serving the couple jointly? In light
of Dr. F’s unexcited reaction, approaching him does not seem
to have harmed anyone. But there is a lesson here: professional duties of confidentiality are relationship-dependent.”
he is also the husband's doctor.
This may well be wrong. After all, the
information that the pharmacist is conveying to the husband-and-wife’s joint fertility doctor came into his possession in the
context of a different professional relationship, one in which the patient is exclusively the wife. Was there not a breach
of confidentiality in sharing her information with a physician serving the couple
jointly? In light of Dr. F’s unexcited reaction, approaching him does not seem to
have harmed anyone. But there is a lesson
here: professional duties of confidentiality
are relationship-dependent.
In any event, calling both physicians
resolved only one of the pharmacist’s dilemmas, namely that pertaining to safety.
This might leave the pharmacist with
reservations about facilitating futile treatment (like providing antibiotics for a viral
infection). But (I rely here on the medical
experts) it seems that neither treatment
is entirely futile. The BC might indeed
prevent implantation, and on the other
hand the fertility medications taken by
both wife and husband have a good chance
of producing a pregnancy. True, pregnancy
is not (I believe) a plausible nor acceptable

sional obligations, it does not really matter. Having made sure that both prescriptions together are safe and that neither is
futile, it is not for him to oversee the woman’s values or sensibility. Her autonomy
means her right to make unwise, even
self-defeating judgments and choices. As I
have argued in other contexts, the healthcare system depends on a commitment
to cooperate despite significant disagreements, at least with regard to assisting
others in their actions (as distinct from a
person being asked to act in person against
his or her principles) (Zohar, 2003).
All this leads, obviously, to the most
grievous issue: the wife’s misleading of
her husband, and her expectation that the
pharmacist continue to take part in what
amounts to cheating his client. I shall
address this first in terms of confidentiality, and then in terms of direct complicity.
The pharmacist has learned that the wife is
misleading her husband, inducing him to
take hormonal treatment—and to make all
manner of personal and financial sacrifices—while working behind his back to
reduce the chances for the outcome toward
which he undergoes all that. The decent
thing to do, in terms of common moral-

ity, would seem to be to tell the husband.
If the wife is unwilling to level with her
husband, is the pharmacist bound by professional morality to hold back from doing
what is right?
In most cases, including those involving diagnosis of STD (and HIV status), I
support a strict application of the duty of
confidentiality, even if breaching it seems
necessary to avert life-threatening eventualities. The main argument for this position—contrary to the famous Tarasoff ruling—was made cogently by Ken Kipnis:
reneging on the promise (explicit or implicit) of confidentiality, or even qualifying
it up-front, will lead prospective patients
to refrain either from seeking treatment or
from disclosing crucial information. This
will prevent healthcare professionals from
delivering effective care, and at the same
time prevent them from attaining the kind
of information that might help third parties
at risk (Kipnis, 2006).
I suppose an argument can be made that
the case at hand is different, since the wife
could have continued obtaining her BC
pills at other pharmacies, without letting
her husband’s pharmacist know of her subterfuge. Even so, the general threat to trust
in healthcare is still a relevant consideration. We can, however, leave this knotty
issue aside, because the question here goes
well beyond that of confidentiality. That
is, because what the wife is requesting
of the pharmacist is not merely to keep
her secret. He is in effect being asked to
continue what he now knows to be active
participation in defrauding a client.
Trust is a cornerstone of healthcare,
but the imperatives of preserving trust
and of being trustworthy cut both ways
(Rhoades & Strain, 2000). The pharmacist’s duty toward one of his clients cannot
be leveraged into a requirement, or even
permission, to cheat another client. Thus
he cannot continue to fill the husband’s
prescription in the context of fertility treatment without warning him of his wife’s
countermeasures. Since there is no easy
walk-away option, he will most likely
have to explain his refusal to the husband.
He might say only “I have learned of a
problem involving your wife that makes
Cont. on page 12
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it impossible for me to fill this prescription.” But this will most probably lead to
the wife’s secret being revealed. For this,
however, she cannot fault the pharmacist,
as it was she who forced his hand by attempting, in effect, to draw him into her
scheme as a co-conspirator.
Noam Zohar, PhD
Director, Graduate Program in Bioethics
Department of Philosophy
Bar Ilan University, Israel
REFERENCES
Kenneth K., “A Defense of Unqualified
Medical Confidentiality,” American Journal
of Bioethics 6(2) 2006, 7-18 (this is a “target
article,” accompanied in the same issue by
many commentaries and critiques).
Rhodes R. & Strain J., “Trust and Transforming Medical Institutions,” Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9(2), 2000:
205-217.
Zohar N., “Cooperation Despite
Disagreement: From Politics to Healthcare,”
Bioethics 17(2) 2003, 121-141; Zohar
N., “Moral Disagreement and Providing
Emergency Contraception: A Pluralistic
Alternative,” American Journal of Bioethics
7(6) 2007, 35-36.

Response from a
Pharmacist-ethicist

D

r. Zohar provided me an unearned benefit (a mitzvah
perhaps?); I saw a draft of his
analysis before I wrote this response. He
has done the philosophical heavy lifting
for the two of us, which I greatly appreciate. I can focus on certain facts of
the case that I believe help resolve the
pharmacist’s angst and illuminate his
options. My mentor, Albert Jonsen, contrasted philosophical ethics with practical
judgment as differing mostly in perspective and compared them to viewing a
road from a balloon versus a bicycle.1
Valuable perspectives arise even in applied ethics from the “altitude” at which
the ethicist views a case, and if Dr. Zohar
has viewed this case from at or above a
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bicycle level, his commentary allows me
to get down on my hands and knees.
First then, from an “earthy” view, I
think it likely that the story told in this
case is apocryphal. The physicians’
responses—and the likelihood that two
physicians would hold such cavalier
attitudes—do not ring true, and the case
omits many details that would be readily
available in an actual instance. Apocryphal or not, I do believe that the case
provides grist for the ethical mill.
Here are case-specific facts about in
vitro fertilization (IVF) therapy2 that a
pharmacist should know or very easily
discover. The husband (DH, or “darling
husband” as he would be described in
IVF chat rooms3), is apparently being
treated for azoospermia. Depending on

of IVF cycles.7 During a normal pregnancy, the follicular remains become the
corpus luteum and produces progesterone
and estrogen necessary to maintain the
pregnancy during the first few weeks.
Retrieval removes the follicle from the
ovary and no corpus luteum can form,
so physicians providing IVF typically
prescribe additional progesterone during
the first few weeks. Some prescribe additional estrogen.
BCPs prevent pregnancy by suppressing endogenous gonadotropin production
and thus preventing ovulation. However,
of course, physicians administer exogenous gonadotropins in high doses during
IVF cycles. The resulting successful
follicular stimulation, oocyte retrieval,
IVF, and transfer thwarts the mechanism

“Pharmacists assume the same commitments to beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and other prima facie duties as do nurses,
physicians, or other health care providers. Here, physicians
are initiators of therapy, with roles as risk assessors who
evaluate risks, explain them to the patient, and obtain the
patient’s informed consent. The pharmacist is at the least a
risk manager who must help minimize the impact of those
risks and help assure proper use of the prescribed drugs.”
the underlying cause, his medications
may vary, but all treatments expose him
to known risks.
As to the wife (DW, in chat room
parlance) and her drug therapy, fertility
physicians frequently do prescribe birth
control pills (BCPs)4 in advance of the
stimulation phase, partly to synchronize
the woman’s cycle. They then give
gonadotropins5 to stimulate maturation
of follicles in her ovaries. Eventually, the
fertility physician retrieves the mature
follicles (a dozen, on average6), fertilizes
in vitro the ova contained in them, and
later transfers the fertilized ova to the
uterus where, hopefully, they will implant
and produce a pregnancy. Pregnancy appears to result in between 20% and 50%

of BCP action. Current evidence does
not support persistent speculation that
BCPs may interfere with implantation of
a fertilized ovum.8 The most salient fact
related to this case is that it is far from
certain that BCPs taken immediately
before or after embryo transfer will actually interfere with the pregnancy. If DW
persists with IVF therapy, she may very
well become pregnant.
Another relevant feature of this case
is the distinct possibility that DW was
taking birth control pills secretly—at
least without telling her husband—well
before they started fertility therapy. Thus,
she could well be quite fertile, which
increases the likelihood she will become
pregnant.

Pharmacists assume the same commitments to beneficence, nonmaleficence,
and other prima facie duties as do nurses,
physicians, or other health care providers.
The pharmacist’s role does differ somewhat from the physician’s in this case.
Here, physicians are initiators of therapy,
with roles as risk assessors who evaluate
risks, explain them to the patient, and obtain the patient’s informed consent. The
pharmacist is at the least a risk manager
who must help minimize the impact of
those risks and help assure proper use of
the prescribed drugs. He or she must also
assume a role as patient advocate.9
I agree that Dr. Zohar’s question about
confidentiality relating to the physician
contacts would surprise most pharmacists. The formal codes of ethics of
pharmacy have since 185210 required
the pharmacist to discuss problems in
the prescription with the prescriber. The
contraindicated use of BCPs in pregnancy
and their possible adverse interaction
with gonadotropins presents the pharmacist with objective information demanding action. The pharmacist also must
question continuing gonadotropin therapy
when the patient does not actually desire
to conceive. The risks of such therapy
clearly outweigh any desired medical
benefits. The two prescribers have clear
interests in these matters. Under these
circumstances, consulting with the physicians is de rigueur.
The pharmacist is right to worry about
participating in a deceptive practice that
poses both physical and financial risks to
DH.11 I mostly agree with Dr. Zohar: the
pharmacist cannot reasonably agree to
DW’s request for confidentiality concerning her attempts to render her husband’s
treatment futile, if DW’s conduct is
actually likely to achieve such an end. A
duty to maintain DW’s confidentiality,

like the duty to avoid deception and possible harm to DH, is a prima facie duty.
In weighing what to do when prima facie
duties conflict, I believe a Tarasoff-like
analysis, based on likely physical harm to
a third party, remains an appropriate balancing test for workaday ethics. However, the pharmacist can fairly conclude that
DW’s IVF therapy is as likely to be successful as any other IVF therapy, in spite
of her use of BCPs. Thus, the pharmacist
can go to sleep at night knowing that, in
spite of DW’s intentions, DH is not actually deceived about the likely results of
his treatment and financial investment.
I do not think the analysis ends here,
however, owing to the ultimate futility of
DW’s choices. She is deceiving her husband to keep the marriage together. She
blames her husband for compelling her to
undergo expensive, dangerous, and sometimes painful procedures that she does
not actually want to experience. Has she
made autonomous informed decisions,
autonomous misinformed decisions, or is
she acting under duress? Someone in her
care team ought to be at least helping her
face the reality that in the long run her
marriage is not likely to succeed based on
her present course of action.
The understanding that marriages and
families are undermined by deceit and
mistrust is not arcane to medical practice.
Here, the pharmacist has the opportunity
to help DW rethink her options. Unless
he has clearly explained to DW why her
strategy of taking BCPs is likely to fail
on pharmacological grounds, he has not
done the least that he should.
William E. Fassett, PhD, RPh
Professor of Pharmacy Law & Ethics
Washington State University
Spokane, Washington

Jonsen AR. Of balloons and bicycles: or,
the relationship between ethical theory and
practical judgment. Hastings Cent Rep 1991;
21(2):14-16.
1.
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financial, therapeutic, and other stresses experienced by these families..
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Since I also teach pharmacy law, I feel compelled to note that physicians and pharmacists
who engage in deceptive business practices
may be sued under a state consumer protection act, whether or not the treatment involved
is negligently performed.
11.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
APRIL
6

18th Annual LHAS Medical Ethics Update and the 26th Annual Messer Lecture: “Reducing Obesity: Personal
Responsibility or Social Policy?” University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Scaife Hall, Auditorium 6, 3550
Terrace Street, Pittsburgh, PA. Visit http://ccehs.upmc.edu.

7

(12-1 pm) “Do Everything!” Truth-telling and Trust Building at the End of Life. Richard Payne, MD, Duke
Divinity School. Annual Shallenberger Lecture in Ethics. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 600 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD,
Hurd Hall. Contact: Sharon Mears (410-955-0620, smears@jhmi.edu).

7

(8 am–4 pm) Professionalism: Actualizing Values in Clinical Practice and Organizational Base. Presented
by Patricia O’Donnell, PhD, LICSW from Inova Health System Center for Ethics & Inova Learning Network, Inova
Fair Oaks Hospital, Medical Plaza Building, 3700 Joseph Siewick Drive, Auditorium, Fairfax, Virginia. To register
call Inova Teleservices at 703-750-8843. For more information contact Patti O’Donnell, PhD, Director, Center for
Ethics, Inova Health System at 703-321-2658 or patricia.o’donnell@inova.org.

13

(4 pm) Why Do Patients Volunteer for Risky Research Studies? Rethinking Informed Consent, Again.
Speaker: Scott Kim, MD, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry Bioethics Program Center, University
of Michigan. 3401 Market St., Room 331, Philadelphia, PA 19104, Tel: 215-898-7136. RSVP to clinksca@mail.med.
upenn.edu or call the Center for Bioethics at 215-898-7136. For more information visit http://www.bioethics.upenn.
edu/colloquium/.

14

(5:45–8:00 pm) Talking with Patients About End of Life Issues: Balancing Honesty, Compassion and Hope.
Presented by Inova Fairfax Hospital Ethics Committee, Inova Fairfax Hospital, Cyrus Vesuna Auditorium Physicians
Conference Center, Falls Church, VA. To register call 703-750-8800.

14

(5:30pm- 6:30pm) Care of an Unresponsive Patient With A Poor Prognosis. Bioethics Forum Presented by the
Ethics Committee of Shady Grove Adventist Hospital: Discussion of New England Journal of Medicine Article:
NEJM 360:5:527-531. The NEJM article may be downloaded from the SGAH Ethics Committee website’s Calendar
page (www.sgahethics.org/calendar.html). Willow Room, Shady Grove Adventist Hospital, 9901 Medical Center
Drive, Rockville, MD 20850, 240-826-6000. For more information, contact Paul S. Van Nice, MD, PhD, MA
Chairman, Ethics Committee (paul@vannice.com, 301-509-2225).

22

Palliative Care Skills for Nursing Home Personnel, Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees
and West Virginia University. Tamarack Conference Center, Beckley, WV. Visit http://wvnec.org/calendar_of_events
for more information, or call 1-877-209-8086.

23

A Time to Choose, A Time to Listen. Rabbi Dayle Friedman will speak about end-of-life decision-making at the
Jewish Community Center of Northern Virginia. Sponsored by The Hebrew Home of Greater Washington.
Visit http://www.hebrew-home.org/site/PageServer, or contact jmichaels@hebrew-home.org, 301-816-7711.

23

(7:45 am–12:00 pm) Communication: the Key to Resolving Conflict and Ethical Dilemmas. Harbor Hospital,
Baltimore, MD, Baum Auditorium. To register, call 410-350-3506 by April 17. For more information, contact Sally
Lewis at 410-350-8218 or Linda Grskovich at 410-350-7794.

24

Palliative Care Skills for Nursing Home Personnel, Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees
and West Virginia University. Bridgeport Conference Center, Bridgeport, WV. Visit http://wvnec.org/calendar_of_
events for more information, or call 1-877-209-8086.

27

(12:15 pm) The Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series presents Thomas Pogge, PhD, Professorial Fellow,
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the Australian National University, Professor of Political Science,
Columbia University, Research Director, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo. 615 N. Wolfe St,
Baltimore, MD, Room W4030. For more information contact Erin McDonald at elmcdona@jhsph.edu.
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29

(4:30 pm) Bioethics in Space: Thorny Ethical Issues at NASA. Speaker Paul Root Wolpe, Director, Center for

Ethics, Emory University; bioethics advisor to NASA. Sponsored by the Bioethics Student Association.
UMBC, Catonsville, MD. Albin O. Kuhn Library, 7th Floor. Visit: http://www.umbc.edu/socsforum/.

MAY
11

(12:15 pm) The Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series presents Norman Daniels, PhD, Mary B.
Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population Health, Harvard School of
Public Health. 615 N. Wolfe St, Baltimore, MD, Room Located at W4030. For more information contact
Erin McDonald at elmcdona@jhsph.edu.

12

(8 am–4 pm) Complex Communication Issues in Clinical Practice: Ethical Obligations and Legal
Regulations. Presented by Patricia O’Donnell, PhD, LICSW from Inova Health System Center for Ethics &
Inova Learning Network, Inova Fair Oaks Hospital, Medical Plaza Bldg, 3700 Joseph Siewick Drive,
Auditorium, Fairfax, Virginia. To register call Inova Teleservices at 703-750-8843. Contact: Patti O’Donnell,
PhD, 703-321-2658 (phone) or patricia.o’donnell@inova.org.

14

(4 pm) Bioethics Colloquium Series Lecture: The University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics
presents a lecture by Ruth Macklin, PhD, Professor of Bioethics, Epidemiology and Population Health,
Albert Einstein College of Medicine. 3401 Market St., Room 331, Philadelphia, PA 19104, Tel: 215-8987136. RSVP to clinksca@mail.med.upenn.edu or call the Center for Bioethics at 215-898-7136. For more
information visit http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu/colloquium/

15

Communication Skills for End-of-Life Care, Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of Ethics
Committees. Stonewall Resort, Roanoke, WV. Visit http://wvnec.org/calendar_of_events for more
information, or call 1-877-209-8086.

28

(8:30 am) The Growth and Development of Pediatric Palliative Care. Speaker Brian Carter, MD.
Pediatric Palliative Care Grand Rounds at the University of Maryland Medical Center Auditorium, 22 S.
Greene St., Baltimore, MD. Contact: DHARNESS@umm.edu..

June
1-5

Bioethics: Beyond the Sound Bite. Intensive Bioethics Course, Georgetown University. Washington, D.C.
Contact 202-687-8099, schofies@georgetown.edu.

17-19

Harvard Bioethics Course. Sponsored by the Division of Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School (HMS),
Boston, MA. http://medethics.med.harvard.edu/education.

July
13-16

Ethics from Boardroom to Bedside. Clinical Ethics Summer Institute, Hamilton Health Sciences, Hamilton,
Ontario (Canada). Visit http://www.clinicalethics.ca.
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